Airport security: Can the Isreali model work in the US?

Bruce Schneier links to a couple of articles by Patrick Smith regarding airline security. The first one addresses the Isreali method of securing their major airport, and their national airline. Mr. Smith believes, however, that the model won't work here, at least not without modification:

But it's not draconian strictness or bullying regulations that make Tel Aviv so impressive -- not on the surface, anyway. It's common sense and efficiency. The place isn't merely safeguarded; it's downright passenger friendly. So it would seem those letter writers are right. We could do worse than emulate our allies in the Middle East. Why can't we, or why don't we, have a system like theirs?

Unfortunately, that's a bit like asking why America's streets can't be as clean as Singapore's. Mostly it's a case of scale. The United States has dozens of mega-terminals, and hundreds more of varying sizes; the nation's top 25 airports each process more than 20 million people a year. Tel Aviv is Israel's sole major airport, handling 9 million passengers annually -- about the same as Raleigh-Durham, N.C. The ability to focus on this single, consolidated portal makes the job comparatively simple. There are aspects worth borrowing, for sure, but it's naive to think Israeli protocols can, in whole, be fitted to a nation that is 50 times more populous, and immeasurably more diverse and decentralized.

The same applies when talking about El Al, the Israeli national airline. No carrier has taken more care to protect its fleet against sabotage, it's true. Among other measures, every El Al jet is outfitted with an anti-missile system. Crews are trained in hand-to-hand combat, and a minimum of six armed marshals ride aboard every El Al flight. But in addition to being one-third owned and funded by the state, El Al is a relatively tiny airline. It operates fewer than 40 aircraft, all hubbed from a single city, and transports just over 3 million passengers yearly. Compare that with American, United or Delta, just to name three, each with more than 500 planes. American Airlines carries roughly 1.7 million passengers every week.

These are valid points and probably correct. As he says, there are aspects worth borrowing. Certainly we should be able to adapt them to our circumstances.

In a followup article he talks about racial profiling and how it won't work because not all terrorists fit a single racial profile:

The 19 skyjackers succeeded not because we failed to flag them -- in fact several of the cabal, including Mohammed Atta, were singled out by the CAPPS-1 (for computer-assisted passenger prescreening system) program then in place -- but because they knowingly anticipated what levels of resistance they would face, from previously gathered intelligence available to check-in staff, and, most important, physical resistance (or lack thereof) from passengers and crew aboard the four doomed Boeings. The attackers took advantage of the skyjack paradigm as it existed at the time. They did not exploit a loophole in airport security; they exploited a loophole in our mind-set and expectations. And whatever can be said of terrorists, they're generally not stupid; the more narrowly we profile, the easier the system becomes to skirt. Routine, as any security or antiterror expert will tell you, is weakness. The trouble with profiling isn't necessarily that it's racist or discriminatory. The trouble is that it doesn't work.

Later in the article, he refers to a different type of profiling, one which Isreal has been using to great effect for years and which I personally think we should adopt:

For more intelligent reading, I highly recommend Bruce Schneier's "Beyond Fear -- Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World." Again, the title says it all. Among his many cogent arguments, Schneier smartly maintains that the most valuable front-line defense against terror is not a one-dimensional preoccupation with skin color. He advocates a mix of random screening and a cadre of well-trained, experienced professionals, skilled in the art of behavioral profiling.

Fortunately, as he notes later, the TSA has a program that it is testing where exactly that type of profiling is being applied. Hopefully it will be done right, succeed, and be adopted at all airports.

In the course if his article, he refers to a "quiz" that is meant to illustrate why we should profile Muslim males. Here's a sample:

• In 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Iran was taken over by:

a. Norwegians from Ballard
b. Elvis
c. A tour bus full of 80-year-old women
d. Muslim male extremists mostly between the ages of 17 and 40

Living as I do in the Puget Sound region, of which Ballard is a part, I immediately got the reference. After some discussion he suggests this alternate quiz of which this is one question:

• In 1994, who nearly succeeding in skyjacking a DC-10 and crashing it into the Federal Express Corp. headquarters?

a. Muslim male extremists mostly between the ages of 17 and 40
b. Michelle Malkin
c. Charlie Rose
d. Auburn Calloway, an off-duty FedEx employee and resident of Memphis, Tenn.

Although he has a good point, I would note that this example is the most recent and it happened twelve years ago. Since then, the majority of international terrorism has been committed by Muslim male extremists mostly between the ages of 17 and 40. So while we certainly shouldn't assume that all terrorists will be people that fall into that demographic, it's a pretty good bet that most will be. Certainly don't limit scrutiny to that group, but we should recognize that membership in that group does indicate an increased risk.